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Despite being routinely underfunded, lawyer disciplinary processes 
must operate in ways that merit the confidence of both society at large and 
the American legal profession.  This means that those who participate in 
lawyer grievance adjudication must be vigilant against systemic abuse 
(whether deliberate or unintentional) and mindful of factors that limit 
institutional competence.  This Essay argues that, in many instances, 
disciplinary authorities should abstain from deciding grievances that 
would require them to rule on unresolved scientific questions, particularly 
if controversial matters are involved.  The Essay further urges that 
grievance rulings must be consistent with American constitutional 
principles which favor robust debate of public issues and hold that even 
unpopular parties have a right to legal counsel.  A lawyer should never be 
subject to discipline based on allegedly misleading advertising absent 
persuasive evidence that the lawyer knowingly, recklessly, or negligently 
made a provably false assertion of fact. 
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*
 
At what point does filing a grievance amount to an abuse of lawyer 
disciplinary processes?  And even if there is no abuse, when does a 
disciplinary authority lack competence to adjudicate a complaint?  Is the 
necessity of ruling on a disputed scientific question the type of quandary 
that, in some cases, makes it impossible for a grievance authority to decide 
allegations of misconduct? 
In October 2011, a Charlotte School of Law professor filed a 
complaint with the District of Columbia Office of Bar Counsel against four 
lawyers with Crowell & Moring LLP (“the lawyers”).1  The complaint 
accused the lawyers of publishing a misleading advertisement.
2
 
The backdrop for this accusation was the ongoing legal and social 
battle between Big Coal and environmentalists.
3
  The precipitating cause 
for the complaint was the fact that eight days after a peer-reviewed medical 
study linked birth defects to the environmental devastation caused by 
mountaintop mining, the lawyers ran an advertisement on their website.
4
  
The advertisement stated, among other things, that “[t]he study failed to 
account for consanquinity [sic], one of the most prominent sources of birth 
defects.”5 
The advertisement provoked a firestorm of criticism on the ground that 
it demeaned the people of Appalachia by perpetuating stereotypes of 
inbreeding.
6
  In response, the lawyers removed the offending language, and 
* Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas.  LL.M., Yale University; J.D., 
University of Notre Dame; B.A., LL.D., St. Vincent College. 
1 Memorandum from Jason Huber to the Office of Bar Counsel, Board on Professional 
Responsibility, District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Oct. 4, 2011), available at 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/files/huber-ethics-complaint-re-crowell.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]; see 
also Brian Baxter, Crowell Hit with Ethics Complaint over Inbreeding Comment, AM. LAW DAILY 
(Oct. 6, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/10/crowell-ethics-
complaint.html; Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Files Ethics Complaint Against Crowell Lawyers for 
Appalachian Inbreeding Suggestion, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 7, 2011, 8:35 AM) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_prof_files_ethics_complaint_against_crowell_lawyers_fo
r_appalachian_inb/. 
2 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
3 See id. at 2–5 (discussing the tension between the mountaintop mining company and the 
scientists who published the study). 
4 Id. at 3–4. 
5 Id. at exhibit B. 
6 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Did Crowell & Moring Insult Appalachians with Inbreeding 
Suggestion?, A.B.A. J. (Jul. 12, 2011, 7:06 AM), 
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apologized for “any offense taken.”7 
In the D.C. complaint, the professor alleged that the lawyers 
failed to recognize decades old empirical research that 
established that consanguinity is no more prevalent in 
Appalachia than anywhere else in the country.  Controlling 
for inbreeding is therefore not necessary.  Thus, due to a 
lack of proper context and support for the Authors’ 
consanguinity comment, the Advertisement as a whole 
was materially misleading and violated Rule 7.1(a) and 
Rule 8.4(c).
8
 
Seemingly the only way that disciplinary authorities could rule on this 
complaint was by making factual findings about whether inbreeding is 
disproportionately prevalent in Appalachia or about whether consanguinity 
causes most birth defects.  Indeed, that may have been the purpose of the 
complaint—a desire to build favorable precedent on factual issues 
important to the victims of mountaintop mining.  However, inasmuch as 
the reasoning of disciplinary authorities rarely becomes public, the 
complaint may have been filed simply to discourage lawyers from 
representing coal operators or to penalize them for seeking to do so. 
Lawyer disciplinary authorities generally have little or no expertise on 
scientific questions like the prevalence of inbreeding or the causes of birth 
defects.  It is therefore questionable whether the all-too-limited financial 
and human resources available for policing the legal profession should be 
spent on this kind of dispute.  These types of issues are far removed from 
the run-of-the-mill cases where lawyers are disciplined under the 
advertising rules for misleading statements about fees,
9
 credentials,
10
 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/did_crowell_moring_insult_appalachians_with_inbreeding_su
ggestion/ (discussing the local media reaction and the law firm’s attempt to distance itself from the 
offensive statements). 
7 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
8 Id. at 8; see D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a) (2011) (“A lawyer shall not make a false 
or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.  A communication is false or 
misleading if it: (1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to 
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading . . . .”); id. R. 8.4 (“It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation . . . .”).  These rules are substantially identical to similarly numbered provisions in 
the American Bar Association’s Model Rules.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 & 8.4 
(2011). 
9 See, e.g., In re Pacior, 770 N.E.2d 273, 274 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (imposing discipline based 
on misleading statements about free initial consultation). 
10 See, e.g., N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, 627 S.E.2d 644, 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding 
that a lawyer’s statement that he was “published” in the Federal Reports was misleading). 
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experience,
11
 or foreign language abilities.
12
 
Whether mountaintop mining causes birth defects or other adverse 
health consequences is a matter of great public concern.
13
  That is why the 
merits of resulting legal claims should be fully aired.  For decades, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that there is a “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”14  This means that lawyers and their 
clients should not be discouraged from raising colorable issues related to 
questions of legal responsibility.  Unfortunately, the filing of a disciplinary 
complaint against lawyers who are willing to make the case of unpopular 
clients threatens to truncate public discussion of important social issues 
and chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. 
The argument behind the D.C. complaint seems to be that the topic of 
consanguinity (at least in Appalachia) is beyond the range of legitimate 
debate because a study of marital records thirty years ago concluded that 
inbreeding was not “unique or particularly common to” Southern 
Appalachia.
15
  Yet, lawyer grievance committees have limited fact-finding 
powers and procedures.  Surely, such a body should not be the tribunal to 
rule on whether a previous scientific study was so definitive as to forbid, 
on grounds of misrepresentation, arguments related to consanguinity in 
cases seeking to hold coal companies responsible for the health-related 
consequences of their actions. 
Not every difference of opinion amounts to a misrepresentation.  The 
fact that one lawyer has disregarded a fact that another lawyer thinks is 
important, and has raised an issue that the other believes lacks merit, does 
not necessarily mean that the first lawyer has misrepresented the evidence.  
Rather, the divergence of perspectives may simply mean that the facts are 
sufficiently complex that there is support for differing views. 
Of course, a point may come where the facts are so clear or 
overwhelmingly established that to deny them is to perpetrate a fraud.  
This might be true today if a lawyer places an advertisement stating, as a 
matter of fact, that smoking tobacco does not cause lung cancer.  However, 
as a general matter, disciplinary tribunals should be wary of declaring that 
                                                                                                                          
11 See, e.g., In re Huelskamp, 740 N.E.2d 846, 848 (Ind. 2000) (per curiam) (involving misleading 
statements about military and teaching experience). 
12 See, e.g., In re Wells, 709 S.E.2d 644, 646–47 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that “We 
Speak Spanish” was misleading on the facts of the case). 
13 See Clara Bingham, A Call to Arms: Citizens Need to Save Appalachia, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville, Ky.), July 10, 2011, at H1 (arguing that mountaintop removal coal mining results in 
increased cancer rates and higher costs to treat illnesses); Ivy Brashear, Editorial, Readers Forum; 
Community Challenge; Mountaintop Mining Poses Threat to Health, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, 
Ky.), July 25, 2011, at A6 (urging citizens of Eastern Kentucky to fight against mountaintop removal 
coal mining). 
14 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
15 Complaint, supra note 1, at 42 exhibit G. 
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there is no room for disagreement on scientific questions. 
It would be dangerous for disciplinary authorities to allow grievances 
to be used as tactical weapons for advancement of partisan purposes 
ancillary to civil litigation.  This is particularly true inasmuch as most 
states hold that the filing of a grievance against a lawyer is absolutely 
privileged.
16
  Preventing the actual or apparent abuse of the lawyer 
disciplinary process is one reason why, even though there is a mandatory 
duty to report misconduct by another lawyer,
17
 it is generally agreed that 
reporting may be deferred until the conclusion of pending litigation from 
which knowledge of the misconduct emerged.
18
 
Courts and ethics advisory committees often wisely decline to rule on 
political questions because those matters are more properly within the 
purview of other branches of government.
19
  So too, it may be prudent for 
disciplinary authorities to avoid adjudicating unsettled scientific 
controversies, which are better resolved in the courts.  Such a choice might 
be justified on the ground that the unresolved state of the relevant science 
means that the grievance is not ripe for adjudication. 
A decision not to rule promptly on a complaint identifying alleged 
lawyer misconduct would not be unprecedented.  “[D]isciplinary 
authorities often suspend or abate their own inquiry [into a grievance 
involving the same conduct as a pending civil or criminal action] so as to 
be able to work with a complete record and avoid duplicative 
investigation.”20 
If a disciplinary authority decides to rule on a grievance arising from a 
purportedly misleading advertisement involving unsettled scientific issues, 
then it is critical for decision-makers to remember the constitutional 
principles that have emerged from both the lawyer advertising cases and 
the law of defamation.  The power to impose lawyer discipline is limited 
by the precedent in each of those areas. 
The lawyer advertising cases hold that while inherently misleading 
                                                                                                                          
16 See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.4 (3d 
ed. Supp. 2009) (indicating that in most states the privilege does not turn on good faith or good cause). 
17 See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2011) (“Self-regulation of 
the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when 
they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
18 See Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 
ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 82–87 (2011) (discussing public policy 
considerations in favor of deferred reporting of misconduct during pending litigation). 
19 See John Caher, Judicial Ethics Committee Punts on Query over Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. L.J., 
Jan. 13, 2012, at 1 (reporting that the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics decided to 
sidestep the question of whether a judge can refuse to perform same-sex marriages on religious grounds 
because the question “raises serious legal issues . . . [which] must be raised and addressed by persons 
with standing in the appropriate legal venue”). 
20 THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS 
AND MATERIALS 58 (10th ed. 2008). 
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statements can be banned, communications that are only potentially 
misleading must be addressed by less restrictive means, such as additional 
disclosure requirements.
21
  The Constitution favors more speech, not less.
22
  
The mere fact someone might misunderstand an advertisement is not 
enough to justify the imposition of discipline. 
The defamation cases make clear that speech about an issue of public 
concern is protected by the First Amendment, unless it includes, expressly 
or implicitly, a provably false assertion of fact.  Statements of opinion that 
do not imply false facts cannot give rise to liability.
23
  In this regard it may 
be noted that the first part of the statement that is the focus of the D.C. 
complaint appears to be indisputably true: the study that linked 
mountaintop mining to birth defects “failed to account for consanquinity 
[sic].”24  The second part of the statement—that consanguinity is “one of 
the most prominent sources of birth defects”25—might be deemed to be not 
provably false (depending on the state of relevant science) or might simply 
be a matter of opinion as to the meaning of conflicting facts. 
One fair interpretation of the advertisement at issue is that the lawyers 
were offering to represent coal companies by making whatever arguments 
were supported by the law and facts.  This line of analysis would 
presumably insulate lawyers from liability for alleged misconduct.  
Lawyers ordinarily have a legal privilege to represent their clients even 
when their doing so is disadvantageous to other persons.
26
 
In one recent case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina dismissed 
                                                                                                                          
21 The Supreme Court explained that: 
[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is 
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such 
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.  
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.  But the States may not place 
an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading 
information . . . . 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); accord In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 684 S.E.2d 560, 
564 (S.C. 2009) (per curiam). 
22 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (“Although, of course, the bar retains 
the power to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred 
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.”). 
23 Cf. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (concluding that statements of 
opinion could support an action for defamation because they were “sufficiently factual to be susceptible 
of being proved true or false”). 
24 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 3. 
25 Id. at 1. 
26 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1071–72 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing a 
privilege sufficient to defeat a claim against a lawyer for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty); Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that the 
lawyer’s privilege to represent his client defeated an action for tortious interference). 
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grievance charges based on misleading advertising.
27
  The court found that 
an advertisement stating variously that a lawyer would “work to protect” 
and would “protect” injured employees from employer retaliation was not 
“misleading in that it created the false impression that by retaining [the 
attorney] an injured employee would not lose his or her job by filing a 
worker’s compensation claim.”28  As the court explained, “[t]his broad 
statement . . . was merely a statement of [the attorney’s] role as an 
advocate on behalf of a client. Within this advocacy role, [the attorney] 
appeared to convey that he would use whatever means, including statutory 
remedies, which were available to guard against a client’s loss of 
employment.”29 
In his complaint, the Charlotte School of Law professor argued that the 
lawyers’ “misleading statement regarding consanguinity . . . is rooted in 
the harmful stereotype that Appalachian communities are more inbred than 
communities elsewhere in the country.”30  He asserts that “[i]t is sound 
policy for the Bar to punish the use of misleading stereotypes in attorney 
advertising.”31  Whether this is true, as a general rule, is certainly open to 
question. 
First, determining whether a statement is rooted in a harmful 
stereotype would often require a disciplinary committee to speculate, and it 
might invite punishment of unpopular speech.  The advertisement that gave 
rise to the D.C. complaint did not expressly invoke any stereotype; it 
simply said that consanguinity was a relevant issue in birth defect cases.
32
  
Second, some stereotypes are merely expressions of opinion and to that 
extent should be constitutionally protected.
33
  It seems doubtful that a 
                                                                                                                          
27 In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 684 S.E.2d at 566. 
28 Id. at 561, 565. 
29 Id. at 565. 
30 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. 
31 Id. 
32 In response to complaints about the advertisement, Crowell & Moring issued the following 
statement: 
Consanguinity is one of a number of commonly addressed issues in studies of 
this type, regardless of geography.  Scientists address this consideration regularly 
because it can matter to scientific conclusions, and do so regardless of locale.  
We did not raise this issue with particular reference to any region, and we did not 
mean to imply any such thing.  That said, we apologize for any offense 
taken . . . .  
Ken Ward, Jr., Mountaintop Removal and Birth Defects: Just What Are the Coal Industry’s Lawyers 
Talking About?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (July 11, 2011), 
http://blogs.wvgazette.com/coaltattoo/2011/07/11/mountaintop-removal-and-birth-defects-just-what-
are-the-coal-industrys-lawyers-talking-about/. 
33 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 (1990).  Although the court declined to enact a 
“so-called opinion privilege” it stated that “protection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by 
existing First Amendment doctrine” and, as such, “‘full constitutional protection’ extends to any 
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consumer lawyer should be disciplined for saying that insurance 
companies or multi-national corporations are greedy and victimize 
ordinary persons.  This is true even if that opinion is rooted in offensive 
and inaccurate stereotypes. 
Third, employing lawyer discipline to banish offensive stereotyping 
might divert attention away from the relevant constitutional inquiry.  The 
question, framed in light of the First Amendment, is not whether an 
utterance reflects bad taste or is found by others to be offensive, but 
whether the statement is false.  Unless the statement is provably false, it 
enjoys an important degree of constitutional protection. 
Finally, while lawyers must respect the rights of third persons, they 
also have an obligation to zealously represent their clients in litigation.
34
  
Thus, relevant provisions in lawyer ethics codes impose discipline for 
disrespect of the rights of third persons only if a lawyer, in representing a 
client uses “means that have no substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”35  Imposing discipline based 
on perceived stereotyping would render meaningless this carefully drawn 
language, which is now part of the law of a multitude of jurisdictions.
36
 
Just a few decades ago, an American Bar Association committee 
headed by former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark
37
 declared the state 
of lawyer discipline in the United States to be scandalously deficient.
38
  
During the intervening years, the field of lawyer discipline has been greatly 
improved.
39
  Yet, today, in every jurisdiction, the process for policing the 
legal profession labors under the realities of limited resources and the need 
for public confidence in the decisions made. 
It would be unwise for disciplinary authorities to venture into the 
unmapped territory of disputed scientific questions or to stray from well-
established constitutional principles in a misguided effort to effectively 
discipline attorneys.  It would also be imprudent for the relevant authorities 
to allow grievances to be effectively used as tactical weapons incidental to 
                                                                                                                          
statement relating to matters of public concern ‘that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating 
actual facts’ about an individual.’”  Id. 
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE (2006) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). 
35 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
36 See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2012) (adopting the text of Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct R. 4.4(a)); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010) (same), 
available at http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/DLRPCFebruary2010.pdf. 
37 Tom C. Clark, OYEZ (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.oyez.org/justices/tom_c_clark. 
38 See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) (“After three years of studying 
lawyer discipline throughout the country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous 
situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession.”). 
39 See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 33, 49–52 (2005) (discussing efforts to modernize lawyer discipline). 
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heated civil litigation. These various considerations require disciplinary 
authorities to exercise restraint and judgment in interpreting and enforcing 
the malleable provisions of lawyer ethics codes. 
